

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 7 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. ŁÓBODYCZ

(Poland)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. D. TEKHOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato A. AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. Manuel TELLO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. M. IONESCU  
Mr. I. IACOB

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. M. STAHL  
Mr. C.G. EKLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV  
Mr. I.I. CHEPROV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Mr. P. THOMAS  
Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.S. MacDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the one hundred and eighty-first meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before calling upon the first speaker, I should like to extend a welcome to the Minister of State of the United Kingdom; Mr. Peter Thomas, who is with us again.

With reference to the welcome, extended in advance by my predecessor in the Chair, to the new leader of the delegation of Burma at this Conference, I should like to express my satisfaction at being able to greet the representative of Burma, Ambassador Sain Bwa, at the first meeting at which he enters upon his duties.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): There is hardly a subject connected with the specific provisions of a future treaty on general and complete disarmament to which the Eighteen-Nation Committee has devoted greater attention than that of the speedy elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war on the basis of the proposal known as the "Gromyko proposal" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). This proposal fully merits the attention given to it, not merely because of its essential character but also because it can narrow the gap between the positions of the parties. Although the Gromyko proposal was made in order to meet the Western delegations half-way, we have from the very outset noticed an open or concealed reluctance on their part to accept it. Unfortunately, we are also once again forced to conclude that the observations of our Western colleagues on this proposal have not primarily been designed to elucidate the details of the proposal, but rather to avoid serious discussion of it as far as possible.

During the discussions at this session the Soviet delegation has already given all the necessary explanations about the Gromyko proposal. But these discussions have helped to establish something else: the fact that the position of the Western Powers on the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war is becoming clearer every day. However hard the Western representatives in the Committee strive to make their attitude look more creditable by talking about a "realistic" approach and about their desire to eliminate the appalling danger "as soon as possible", the substance of their position remains unchanged. Instead of the danger of a thermonuclear war disappearing first, before all other dangers, as the interests of humanity require, the West takes the line that it should disappear last.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

It is only proper to point out that the United States delegation is becoming increasingly frank in expressing its satisfaction with the existing situation in the world, a situation which it finds acceptable because of what it terms the "rough balance of destructive capability" (ENDC/PV.179, p.13). In reply to the Indian delegation, Mr. Fisher said:

"... it has been suggested that we should all agree to work on the basis of the suggestions which Foreign Minister Gromyko has made on behalf of the Soviet Union ... It has been urged that, if we were to agree in principle on the elements of that proposal, it would make it easier for us to find ways of reaching agreement on the reduction and elimination of armaments". (ibid., p.12)

Mr. Fisher went on to say:

"The United States ... cannot agree to the suggestion which has been made that we accept that proposal in principle as a means of getting on with our work". (ibid., p.13)

Among the alleged defects of the Soviet proposal the United States delegation listed first and foremost the possible destruction of the bulk of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. The United States cannot accept the principle that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of certain types of missiles equipped with warheads, which would be retained until the end of the process of general and complete disarmament, should be destroyed within a short period. No account is taken of the fact that, by now, a small proportion of the existing nuclear armaments is enough to destroy human life on this planet many times over; apparently the United States would, in practice, like to retain this capacity for destruction right to the end of the process of disarmament.

In other words, while disarming, the world would constantly face the threat of war, which would certainly be a nuclear war, and this certainty would increase with the passage of time. But can this be described as disarmament? The crux, the kernel of the whole concept of general and complete disarmament is precisely the elimination of the threat of a thermonuclear war. The retention of the threat of a thermonuclear war, whatever name may be given to it and whatever arguments may be used to justify it, is a denial of the idea of general and complete disarmament in this era of thermonuclear weapons.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Of course, the Second World War, which was fought with conventional weapons, caused heavy human and material losses. It is essential to eliminate the possibility of any sort of war -- conventional or thermonuclear -- from the life of human society. This is the solution proposed in the Soviet draft treaty. But can the disasters suffered by mankind in the recent past be compared with those which a thermonuclear war would bring? Numerous statements have been made on this subject by scientists, military experts and statesmen. For example, this is what the Head of the Soviet Government said on 10 July 1962 at the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace in Moscow:

"Competent Western nuclear scientists estimate that the 'nuclear death potential' in the contemporary world amounts to 250,000 megatons, or 250,000 million tons of TNT. This makes more than 80 tons of explosive for every inhabitant of our planet." (ENDC/47, p.3)

"... nuclear rocket war completely erases the line between the battlefield and the rear. What is more, it is the civilian population that will be the first victim of the weapons of mass annihilation. In a war of this sort, just a few thermonuclear bombs are capable of wiping out not only enormous industrial centres with populations of many millions, but whole countries. American experts estimate that one 20-megaton hydrogen bomb, exploded in the air, would raze to the ground all brick and frame houses within a radius of 24 kilometres from ground zero. A roaring ocean of flame would engulf everything that burns, all living beings, over a distance equal to that from New York to Philadelphia.

"... the prominent American scientist Linus Pauling, estimates in his book, 'No More War', that the probable number of victims of a nuclear war will be 800 millions." (ibid., p.6)

A similar appraisal of a possible nuclear war has also been given by many Western leaders with a sober outlook on affairs. This, therefore, is the evil which humanity must combat today, and it is for us, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to propose ways and means of eliminating it.

In the face of this nuclear threat, all considerations such as the balance of forces, one of the main objections raised to the Soviet disarmament proposals, must be set aside. Unfortunately the Western delegations continue to hold that not only

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

the balance of forces but also a firm peace are inconceivable without nuclear weapons, although they cannot produce any evidence of this. On the contrary, the most responsible leaders of the Western States reject the view, which is still being put forward at our meetings, that the USSR and its allies would have certain military advantages if the disarmament process were to begin with weapons of mass destruction.

The Committee has already been working for some considerable time. The Western delegations have more than once made the claim that, if nuclear weapon delivery vehicles were destroyed at the beginning of the disarmament process, the "balance" would be upset to the advantage of the Soviet Union and its allies and to the disadvantage of the Western countries. This theory, however, has never been convincingly proved. The argument is advanced that the Soviet Union, because of its geographical position and area and because of its great strength in conventional armaments and armed forces, would gain some advantage if the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament were adopted as a basis -- an argument that has been refuted by responsible Western statesmen themselves. We consider that the Western representatives who use this argument in the Committee should bear in mind what their own responsible leaders are saying at home. We know that Mr. McNamara, the United States Secretary of Defense, does not share this view; that is clear from a speech he delivered on 18 November 1963, in which he gave facts and figures (ENDC/PV.165,p.29) to demolish this argument, the one most often repeated in this Committee by Western representatives in order to substantiate their theory of the so-called balance of strength.

The groundlessness of the argument used by the Western representatives in this connexion is thus clearly demonstrated. The question arises why they use this argument. Is it not because the Western delegations interpret the concept of balance to mean not an equal capacity -- or rather, an equal incapacity -- to wage a nuclear war, but a balance -- or, more exactly, an imbalance -- in their favour? This would be to encourage dangerous illusions which can in no way benefit our talks or the cause of disarmament.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

The peoples of the world want nuclear disarmament above all else; yet they are told that, until the end of the disarmament process and even thereafter, they must live under the constant threat of multiple destruction. Does this bear any resemblance whatsoever to disarmament? Surely this is not what the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was asked to accomplish.

A comparison of that disarmament plan with the other partial measures proposed by the Western delegations -- for instance, the establishment of observation posts as an isolated step, unconnected with any other measure (ENDC/130) -- discloses a familiar pattern in the practice of disarmament talks: the West proposes, not the elimination of the nuclear threat, not general and complete disarmament under strict international control, but the preservation of the "military structures" of States, of their nuclear missile potential, and of the "rough balance of destructive capability" -- in other words, the regulation and organization of the present state of affairs under a system of control and inspection.

Is it necessary to go back to the early stages of our talks and restate well-known facts such as our purpose and the reason for the establishment of this Committee on Disarmament? These facts are set out in unequivocal terms in resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth sessions, and in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5), which has been approved by the United Nations. All our work should be governed by one fundamental idea: that of creating in our day and in a short space of time a world from which war has been excluded once and for all. We must strive, not to regulate and limit armaments, not to ensure controlled warfare, not to organize an armed world, but specifically to achieve a world without armaments. If we in fact follow that path, the question of control will cease to be a stumbling-block. We need only recall Premier Khrushchev's statement that the Soviet Union will accept any Western proposal on control as soon as the Western States accept the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament.

Since some Western representatives have referred to the fifth of the Agreed Principles in support of their thesis of a "balance of destructive capability", we also propose to make a brief reference to those Agreed Principles. We cannot but agree

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

with the Polish delegation that the Western representatives are placing their main emphasis on the first part of the fifth principle, which states that measures should be balanced, and are overlooking its underlying purpose, which is to ensure security equally for all. In any case, if we are going to interpret the Agreed Principles, we can and must also refer to the third principle, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of which specifically provide for the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as part of the programme for general and complete disarmament.

Could it be otherwise? Nuclear weapons have not only been tested under laboratory and experimental conditions; they were actually dropped on two Japanese cities nineteen years ago when they were still, so to speak, in their infancy. The inhuman character of these weapons was then made clear and still is clear. Such weapons should not be allowed to exist; they should never be used anywhere again, but should be immobilized and eliminated once and for all.

When and how? The Soviet Union and the socialist States give a clear answer to this question: by means of radical measures of nuclear missile disarmament as early as the first stage of the programme of general and complete disarmament. A majority of States in the world favour such a solution. The only dissenting States are a few members of NATO which would prefer a gradual percentage reduction in accordance with the United States plan (ENDC/30). But we have only to study the first stage of that plan to understand what disarmament carried out on that basis would be like. As you know, the United States plan provides for the full retention of nuclear weapons during the first three-year stage. Delivery vehicles would be gradually reduced by 30 per cent, which in practice would mean, in the present state of missile and other delivery techniques, that the entire mass of nuclear weapons could be delivered to specific targets.

Obviously a more constructive approach to the question is required from the Western States. But what is essential above all is recognition of the need to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war at the very outset of disarmament. The result

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

would be a constructive approach, in particular to the "nuclear umbrella" proposal, made with a view to meeting the Western Powers half-way. That constructive approach has already been indicated: in view of the need to eliminate the nuclear threat first and above all, the Gromyko proposal should be accepted as a basis for our further work on a disarmament treaty. No one will question the importance and necessity of clarifying individual provisions of any proposal on which the parties have to reach agreement. Where necessary, all the detailed points arising out of the Soviet "nuclear umbrella" proposal will certainly be clarified and agreed upon before we finally come to terms on the proposal itself.

Mr. Fisher's statement of 31 March contained the following passage:

"The United States is of course interested in any proposal which the Soviet Union makes in the most important field of general disarmament.

That is why we will continue to seek information about that proposal and are prepared to discuss it on its merits." (ENDC/PV.179, p.13)

As you see, the United States delegation once again states that it considers nuclear disarmament to be the most important field of general disarmament. But in all the United States proposals this "most important field" is relegated to the distant background and, during discussion of the substance of the Soviet proposal, baseless arguments are put forward, the gist of which is that nuclear weapons safeguard peace and that no form of disarmament at all can be carried out unless the threat of nuclear war is retained right up to the end of the disarmament process.

In this connexion, we have heard speeches in this Committee extolling the miraculous power and "deterrent" effect of certain types of weapon because of their invulnerability; we have also heard assertions that weapons of this type are a "guarantee" of the peace and security, not only of the States possessing them, but of all the nations of the world. To hear arguments of that sort in favour of preserving the threat of a nuclear war, one might sometimes think that we were at a meeting, not of a committee on disarmament, but of some important military-political body discussing the strategic problems of a possible war.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

We defer to the accurate information available to our colleagues from the Western nuclear Powers regarding the merits of this or that ultra-modern weapon; but we are also convinced that the modern development of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, constitutes a major threat to the whole human race and that this development cannot be justified by any "doctrine", religion, or sociological or any other views. The Soviet Government has yet again offered a solution in its "nuclear umbrella" proposal, which must be studied. We were rightly reminded of the views expressed by certain scientists in the final communiqué of the 12th Pugwash Conference:

"We welcome the proposal of the USSR to extend it" -- the nuclear umbrella -- "to the end of the disarmament process. We regard the possibility of agreement on the principles of a nuclear umbrella or minimum deterrent force to offer one of the most hopeful avenues to reach agreement on comprehensive disarmament under effective controls". (ENDC/PV.177, pp.28,29).

Acceptance of the Soviet proposal will be welcomed by all peoples, by the great majority of governments and, as shown by the debates in the United Nations and in our Committee, by a majority of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The Western delegations must now decide how long they wish to remain in a minority on this supremely important problem of our day. We sincerely hope that it will not be very long.

Mr. THOMAS (United Kingdom): The Committee has spent a good deal of time this session at its Tuesday meetings in discussing the United States and Soviet proposals (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1,2,3; ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1) for the reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles during the disarmament process. Although those discussions have not appreciably reduced the wide gap which still exists between the two sides, some sort of dialogue has, I believe, started to develop and will, I believe, continue at future meetings.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

Before proceeding to the main part of my statement today, I should like to welcome Mr. Nehru back to the Committee and to comment briefly on the suggestion made by his predecessor two weeks ago (ENDC/PV.177,p.28) that the Committee should accept in principle the Soviet Government's "nuclear umbrella" or nuclear deterrent thesis, which was referred to this morning by the representative of Bulgaria. The purpose of the suggestion made by the representative of India was apparently to encourage the advocates of that thesis to explain in detail to the Committee precisely what that thesis means and what it would involve. So far, of course, they have failed to do so.

While we in the United Kingdom delegation always appreciate any attempt to help the Committee to move forward in its work, I am bound to ask what prevents the advocates of that thesis from explaining it fully to us here and now. In any case, the retention of a type of "nuclear umbrella" or deterrent by both sides at progressively lower levels during the disarmament process has always been implicit in the Western plan. True, the type of nuclear deterrent now advocated by the Soviet Government seems different in a number of important respects from that envisaged in the Western plan, especially in stages I and II. In particular, there appears to be a basic disagreement about the rate at which nuclear delivery vehicles should be reduced during each stage of the disarmament process. In other words, the two sides appear to differ widely on the size and shape of the nuclear deterrents to be retained at most points during that process.

But the fact remains that, as I understand the position, the Soviet Government has now virtually accepted in principle part of the Western thesis: namely, that both sides would have to retain some type of nuclear deterrent during the disarmament process. Moreover, as the United Kingdom delegation has pointed out before, we believe that both sides may be closer together than hitherto on the sort of situation which might be reached towards the end of that process. What is therefore now required is surely not more agreements in principle, but detailed elaboration of the Soviet proposals to enable us precisely to measure the present gap between those proposals and those of the West. It is surely one thing for the Committee to approve in principle the general idea of the retention of nuclear deterrents by

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

both sides during the disarmament process, and quite another thing to approve of a particular type of deterrent, which is unclear in its detailed and essential aspects, which may be only one possible type among many, and which the Soviet Government wants to introduce at the outset of the disarmament process.

Indeed, to ask the Committee to accept in principle the nuclear deterrent apparently envisaged by the Soviet Government is, in our view, unwise because such information as has so far been given to us leads to the conclusion that it is unsatisfactory for all sorts of reasons. Some of those reasons have been explained by the United Kingdom delegation at recent meetings. This morning I should like, if I may, to draw the Committee's attention to an aspect of the Soviet proposals which renders them open to serious criticisms. I refer to the fact that, whatever those proposals may or may not involve in stages II and III, and regardless of their defects in many other respects, they would greatly overload or overburden stage I of the disarmament process.

Those of us who have studied the discussions in the early days of this Conference will recall that, although the Soviet Government subsequently decided on two occasions to modify its position in respect of stages II and III, its approach to stage I has undergone almost no change whatever in the last eighteen months or so. Thus many of the objections raised by the United Kingdom and other delegations, including some non-aligned delegations, against the measures proposed for stage I under the Soviet plan remain as valid as when they were first put forward.

As we all know, article 19 of the Soviet plan proposes that stage I should last only eighteen months. It is proposed during this short period of time, inter alia, to destroy and verify the destruction of massive amounts of both nuclear and conventional armaments.--- almost all the nuclear armaments and 30 per cent of the conventional armaments. It is proposed that States should dismantle almost all their main means of security at the very outset of the disarmament process, when confidence between them obviously would not be, and obviously could not be, fully developed.

I think we are all agreed that confidence between States is an essential condition for any substantial disarmament. One of the reasons we are not making more progress in our negotiations lies in the fact that such confidence is lacking.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

This may be a deplorable fact, but it is none the less a fact which we cannot ignore. In our view, eighteen months from the start of the disarmament process would simply not be long enough for the creation of sufficient confidence among States -- especially among those which have inherited a legacy of mistrust -- to proceed with such drastic measures of disarmament as are proposed by the Soviet Government.

Surely, if we are realistic, we must all accept the fact that the only way to begin disarmament is to begin. As nations see that limitation or destruction of some of their armaments does not put at risk their national safety, they will be prepared to go on to further progressive reductions, until ultimately general and complete disarmament is achieved. To point out that, on any realistic analysis, this process will inevitably be slow and will take many years does not imply that we do not wish to reach that final objective. The United States disarmament plan is not sacred or immutable in this respect, but it seems to us to be based on a realistic estimate, and realism breeds confidence.

Our Thursday meetings are rightly devoted to measures which would build up confidence and make general disarmament more easy. As disarmament proceeds, the confidence which will persuade States to carry out the later stages of the treaty will only spring from the effective implementation of the earlier stages. That, in turn, will depend largely on the ability of the international disarmament organization to ensure that all States are disarming in accordance with the agreed programme. The international disarmament organization will only be able to do this through effective verification measures. It is only when States are assured that their potential adversaries are in fact disarming in as orderly and balanced a way as they are themselves that confidence will start to grow.

In stage I of the Soviet plan the international disarmament organization will apparently be responsible only for verifying the actual physical destruction of armaments at the "bonfires", to use our jargon. We have been told repeatedly that the Soviet Government opposes any verification of legally-retained armaments, though its position on this point has been somewhat ambiguous ever since it agreed to some form of control of the missiles to be retained legally in stages II and III under its own proposals. We have also been told that the Soviet Government opposes any verification to provide reasonable assurance that no armaments have been retained clandestinely or produced illegally.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

Taking the Soviet plan as it now stands, however, we must ask ourselves the following questions. Would the international disarmament organization in fact be able to fulfil in stage I even those tasks which the Soviet Government is at present disposed to assign to it? Could the international disarmament organization organize and verify efficiently the destruction of such vast quantities of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first few months of its existence, in addition to carrying out its other duties of organizing and verifying the destruction of huge amounts of conventional weapons and the disbanding of forces -- to mention only some of the tasks envisaged in articles 5 to 15 of the Soviet draft treaty?

To answer those questions, let us consider in some detail just what would be involved in terms of the actual physical destruction of armaments and, even more important, the verification of such destruction in stage I of the Soviet plan. Let us first of all consider the enormous numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles to be destroyed. Apart from certain limited exceptions, to be agreed, all nuclear delivery vehicles would have to be destroyed in stage I. This would mean all intercontinental ballistic missiles, all intermediate-range ballistic missiles and all medium-range ballistic missiles; it would mean all aircraft, apart from defence fighters, and all tactical nuclear delivery systems; it would mean all dual-purpose artillery pieces, all large surface ships and all submarines -- all of which, of course, are capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

Now, according to the Institute for Strategic Studies pamphlet entitled The Military Balance: 1963-4, each of the major Power groupings possessed last October some 2,600 strategic missiles and bombers, making a rough total of some 5,200. Under the Soviet plan almost all of those 5,200 strategic missiles and bombers would have to be destroyed in only eighteen months. That would involve a destruction rate of almost 70 strategic missiles and bombers each week. In addition, all tactical nuclear delivery vehicles and dual-purpose artillery would have to be destroyed. Figures for these were not published in the Institute for Strategic Studies pamphlet, but it is no secret that enormous numbers would be involved.

Moreover, according to the same publication, last October the Warsaw Pact countries had some 393 warships of escort and larger types; the comparable figure for the West was 1,233. The Warsaw Pact countries also had some 524 submarines,

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

while the West had 294. Thus some six months ago 2,444 warships, submarines and surface vessels were possessed by the two major Power groupings alone and, using the Soviet Government's own definition, were capable of delivering nuclear weapons. These too, then, would have to be destroyed in only eighteen months under the Soviet plan. I say "destroyed" and not merely "stripped of their armament", because Mr. Zorin told us at our meeting of 3 August 1962:

"But we" -- that is, the Soviet Union -- "propose to destroy also the hulls of all submarines and large surface warships." (ENDC/PV.65,p.42)

These figures for actual or potential nuclear delivery vehicles are merely an estimate of what was available to each side six months ago. For obvious reasons, they did not necessarily present an entirely accurate picture when they were published. They may well be out of date by now. It is certain that they will be entirely out of date by the time a disarmament treaty is negotiated and concluded. Moreover, these figures do not take into account, for example, any vessels of nations not belonging to the two major Power groupings which, of course, might well fall into the category of potential nuclear delivery vehicles.

Of course, Soviet acceptance of the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear vehicles would put a significant brake on future increases in many of these specific categories. But so long as the Soviet Union refuses to accept this proposal, its own proposals for a vast amount of verified physical destruction of armaments in stage I will become progressively more unrealistic. It is self-evident that the greater the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles -- to take only one category of weapons -- the harder it will be to destroy them and verify their destruction in only eighteen months.

Judging by recent statements made by Soviet political and military leaders, the build-up in these and other armaments is not as one-sided as our Eastern colleagues would have us believe. The Soviet Union and its allies are also increasing their military power and armaments. No country can claim a monopoly of virtue in this respect so long as we live in an armed world.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

So far, I have been considering the immense amount of destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles envisaged in stage I of the Soviet plan which would have to be verified. But this is only one aspect of the problems posed by that plan. As we all know, 30 per cent of all conventional armaments are also to be destroyed and their destruction verified during the same period.

The Committee will recall that at our meeting of 27 August 1962 Mr. Kuznetsov told us that the following types of weapons are to be regarded as conventional weapons, and I should now like to list them: anti-aircraft defence fighter planes, military transport planes, communications aircraft, helicopters, aircraft used for initial training, irrespective of their airborne weight, tanks, self-propelled guns, armoured carriers, armoured cars of all types, artillery unsuitable for firing nuclear shells, such as field guns, anti-aircraft guns, coastal defence artillery, anti-tank guns, mortars and rocket-firing guns of every calibre unsuitable for the combat use of nuclear weapons, all kinds of light firearms, including machine guns, automatic rifles, carbines, rifles, pistols, grenade-throwers; and finally, surface warships and ships that cannot be adapted for the combat use of nuclear weapons. (ENDC/PV.75, pp.40,41)

I have inflicted this long list on the Committee to show the magnitude of destruction of purely conventional armaments which has also been proposed by the Soviet Government for stage I and which would have to be verified. This 30 per cent reduction in conventional armaments will, of course, apply not only to the major Powers, but to all parties to the treaty. This means that all nations which possess any of the armaments to which Mr. Kuznetsov referred would also be involved. Admittedly, the number of arms of smaller countries may not be important in comparison with those of the major Powers. Nevertheless, destruction of 30 per cent of their armaments will also have to be verified by the international disarmament organization if neighbouring States are to be given sufficient assurance for them to continue destroying their own weapons.

In case my Soviet colleague is tempted to reply that the proposal for a 30 per cent reduction of conventional armaments in stage I is a Western one, let me remind him that the Western plan allows three years for stage I, or twice as long as the Soviet plan, and that it does not, of course, envisage anything like the same volume of destruction and verification, for example, of nuclear delivery vehicles.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

This, then, gives some idea of the enormous amount of physical destruction of armaments which the Soviet Government proposes should take place in stage I and which it expects the international disarmament organization to verify in the very short period of eighteen months. Could all this be done? There is every reason to believe that it could act. While it might just conceivably be possible to accomplish the actual physical destruction involved -- although we have serious doubts about that -- the difficulties involved in organizing and verifying such a massive amount of destruction would be very great, if not prohibitive. Moreover, confidence between States is not now sufficiently developed for, and would not be sufficiently created by, the acceptance of such proposals. For these reasons alone the Soviet proposals for destruction of armaments in stage I are not, in the present world situation, realistic.

I should now like to turn to another point. Any acceptable plan for disarmament must not only provide for balance to be maintained at the end of each stage, but must also phase reductions during each stage so that balance will be preserved throughout. Clearly the faster the pace of disarmament, the more important its phasing will become. When States are divesting themselves of by far the greater part of their national armouries, they will want to be assured at any given point that their potential adversaries are doing the same. Thus arrangements will have to be made to ensure that reductions in those categories of armaments which we may eventually agree should be destroyed in stage I will be made almost simultaneously by all States.

Without such arrangements for phasing, and without effective verification of such arrangements, it would be quite possible for one side to concentrate on destroying its less effective conventional armaments at the start of stage I, leaving its more effective armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles, until the end of that stage. If the other side were reducing all categories steadily throughout that stage, it would clearly find itself at a profoundly dangerous disadvantage during that stage. Moreover, the possible disparity in numbers of some types of armaments makes it essential that clearly-defined steps should be laid down setting out just how many arms of each category are to be destroyed.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

The Soviet Government, however, has given no indication whatever of how it intends to phase the destruction of the immense quantities of armaments it has proposed for stage I so that the balance shall not be upset during that stage. I cannot help wondering whether it has even considered this particular problem. In fact, with so much disarmament crammed into a short period of eighteen months, we fail to see how any adequate phasing arrangements could ever be made. Without such arrangements and without proper verification it is quite possible, as I have said, that one side might accidentally or deliberately fall behind in its destruction programme. With so many weapons being destroyed so quickly, this would clearly prejudice the security of the other side which had loyally fulfilled its obligations. Moreover, with the hectic pace of disarmament envisaged by the Soviet Government it might well be too late for the second side to restore the balance. The damage would have been done, even if it were unintentional. Even if it did not cause a total breakdown of the treaty, it would certainly destroy what confidence had been gained and might well create a most unstable situation in the world.

These, then, are some of the reasons why we regard the Soviet proposals for stage I as unrealistic. The collective total of the measures proposed for stage I under that plan would be so vast that the volume of destruction proposed would be too large for adequate verification in the short time allowed and, even more important, for the creation of confidence between States. The fact that the Soviet Government has given the Committee no idea of the sort of detailed time-table it envisages for the destruction of armaments in stage I speaks for itself.

Let me again remind the Committee that confidence is one of the main keys to disarmament. The mere signing of a treaty on general and complete disarmament -- great though that event would be -- will not automatically create confidence. Confidence will only be created gradually thereafter as States disarm, as States are seen to be disarming, and as States see other States disarming too. No State can be expected to run the risk of jeopardizing its security by engaging in excessive reductions of its defence potential in a short period of time without adequate assurance that others are doing the same. Confidence must therefore be steadily built up throughout the disarmament process by gradual, but effective, measures of disarmament properly verified.

(Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom)

Thus, whatever the merits of the Soviet proposals for the retention of nuclear deterrents in stages II and III, these seem to me largely irrelevant so long as they are linked to proposals which overburden stage I. Although we cannot yet accurately assess the merits of these proposals, we are prepared to accept the view that they may have improved the original Soviet plan. But the fact remains that, by continuing to overload stage I, the Soviet Government is preventing this Committee from reaching agreement on a disarmament treaty and thus preventing the disarmament process under such a treaty from starting at all. It is surely better to reach agreement on a gradual system of disarmament on the lines proposed by the West than to have no agreement because the Soviet Government insists on including dramatic but unrealistic proposals in stage I. So long as they do so, agreement will, I fear, continue to elude us.

In conclusion, let me end on a slightly more positive note. We in the United Kingdom delegation believe that realistic measures of disarmament must be taken first, and not the extreme steps envisaged so early in the disarmament process under the present Soviet plan. That is why we have supported the proposals for percentage reductions of nuclear delivery vehicles over a period of years. As the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. Butler, pointed out at our meeting of 25 February in regard to these proposals:

"They may not be perfect, but they seem to us a fair, reasonable and realistic way to start." (ENDC/PV.169, pp. 13, 14)

Our Soviet colleagues have not, I think, really explained in detail or in depth just what problems they might have with the Western plan in respect of the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles either during or towards the end of the disarmament process. If they did so, we should indeed be glad to hear their comments. As we have pointed out in the past, we are always ready to consider any reasonable comments offered by any delegation in this Committee.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia): I should like to begin my statement today by associating myself with the preceding speakers in welcoming the return to our midst of the leader of the Indian delegation, Mr. Nehru.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will soon have completed three months of its deliberations this year. That fact invites us to reflect on why we have not been capable of advancing even a small step forward in the field of general and complete disarmament, despite favourable conditions which were created for negotiations. What is the cause of this regrettable and unsatisfactory situation?

Last January we resumed our talks under conditions which were definitely more favourable than at any time in the past. Together with a certain improvement in the international climate, due to the agreements signed last year, these favourable conditions were created primarily by the presentation of the significant proposal by the Government of the Soviet Union on the retention of a "nuclear umbrella" until the end of the disarmament process (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). That proposal would make it possible to settle in a satisfactory way the problem of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles and thus also not only the key problem of stage I but at the same time that of the whole process of general and complete disarmament -- namely, to do away with the menace of a nuclear war at the very beginning of this process.

That is why the Soviet proposal has already been welcomed by a number of delegations at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. It met with a broad response and support from the entire world public, including those in scientific circles, as clearly attested to at the sessions of the Pugwash Conference.

The course of our discussion in the Committee has also demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of the delegations are fully aware of the extraordinary significance of that new step forward which the Government of the Soviet Union took in order to meet the positions of the Western Powers in the interest of making progress in our deliberations. I would remind the Committee that the delegation of Burma, for example, on 30 January described that step as --

"... the most important move that has yet been made in the field of nuclear disarmament since the Soviet ....and the United States.... disarmament plans were submitted ..."

(ENDC/PV.161, p.8)

Also positive was the evaluation of the Soviet proposal made by other non-aligned delegations, and most recently, on 24 March, by the representative of India, who said:

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

"... the delegation of India views with favour the principle contained in the Gromyko proposal for a 'nuclear umbrella' ..."

He added

"... the Committee's discussions will proceed more fruitfully if this thesis is accepted by us all." (ENDC/PV.177, pp.30, 31)

The indisputable significance of the Soviet proposal led most of the delegations in our Committee to take the position that the continuation of our discussion on the basis of the principles contained in that proposal would enable us to make progress in our deliberations on general and complete disarmament and in finding a solution to the problem of nuclear delivery vehicles. That was very clearly and aptly indicated at our 177th meeting by the representative of India, who said that —

"... we should be taking a useful and constructive step if we proceeded on the basis of the 'nuclear umbrella' thesis." (ibid., p.29)

Despite all that, the opportunity has so far remained unutilized owing to the approach of the delegations of the Western Powers, which continue to be opposed to beginning negotiations on the basis of the principles formulated in the Soviet proposal. That was confirmed again on 31 March by the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, who said:

"the United States ... cannot agree to the suggestion which has been made that we accept that proposal in principle as a means of getting on with our work." (ENDC/PV.179, p.13)

As we listened this morning to the statement of the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, the Minister of State, Mr. Thomas, we learned that the United Kingdom delegation also refused to respond to the appeal of the Indian delegation.

Why is that so? After all, the substance of the Soviet proposal had been clarified by the Socialist delegations more than once, and therefore cannot give rise to any doubts. The real reason behind the negative position of the Western delegations is their unwillingness to accept the basic concept of the Soviet proposal, which proceeds from the necessity of taking effective steps to eliminate in substance the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war at the initial stage of general and complete disarmament. That fact cannot be hidden by any constructed objections which the delegations of the Western countries continue to raise against the Soviet proposal.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

In order to justify their negative position, the Western delegations have recently attempted to invoke the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations contained in the Joint Statement (ENDC/5) made by the Soviet Union and the United States of America in the autumn of 1961. The main objection of the Western Powers is the contention that the Soviet proposal would allegedly lead to a shift in the existing balance of forces which, in their view, would violate in particular the principle contained in paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement. In this connexion the Western Powers employ the notion of a "rough balance of destructive capability" which today allegedly constitutes the main guarantee of peace and which should be preserved even throughout the disarmament process.

At the same time the Western delegations try to create the impression that the Joint Statement is based on such a "rough balance". Characteristic in this respect was the statement made on 31 March by the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, who said:

"The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles reflects an understanding on where we stand now -- a situation in which there is a rough balance of destructive capability." (ENDC/PV.179, p.13)

It is not clear to us what led the United States delegation to such a contention. It is an indisputable fact that neither the text of the Joint Statement nor that of any of the documents published on the negotiations preceding the adoption of the Statement contains anything justifying such a contention.

To what does paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement refer? It provides as follows:

"5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ENDC/5, p.2)

Paragraph 5 formulates a just demand for the ensuring of equal security for all in the process of disarmament.

The demand for the ensuring of equal security in the disarmament process, which constitutes the core of paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement, must not in any case be mistaken for the demand of the Western Powers to the effect that the present situation, which they qualify as a "rough balance of destructive capability" -- that is, the balance of power, or the balance of nuclear deterrent, if you wish --

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

should be preserved throughout the process of general and complete disarmament. Such a position is quite untenable. After all, the leading officials in the West themselves emphasize that this situation directly conditioning the arms race not only does not ensure the security of any State but, on the contrary, produces the constant danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. It is the urgent need to eliminate this dangerous situation which makes general and complete disarmament the most pressing and important objective of today.

On the other hand, as a matter of fact, the attempts to preserve the "rough balance of forces" in the disarmament process -- which in any case is immeasurable and non-comparable -- are by their substance in direct contradiction of the implementation of general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, the United States delegation does not want to recognize this, as clearly follows from the statement made on 31 March by the representative of the United States, who said:

"Our view of the balance to be maintained is not a simplified mathematical formula; it rests upon present military realities, upon the rough balance with which we live; and that balance we submit, is not maintained in the approach by the Soviet Union."

(ENDC/PV.179, p.14)

We are startled by that statement. We cannot but ask: what is the United States idea of general and complete disarmament if it demands that the "present military realities" should be maintained during its course? Anyway, what are those "realities"? They are nothing but the accumulation and retention of huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and means for their delivery, the intensification of the arms race, the existence of military groupings, the maintenance of foreign military bases in the territories of other States, and the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other States -- recently employed in increasing measure in cases of flagrant, open interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign States and the suppression of national liberation movements.

All those are the worst vestiges of the "cold war", associated with serious danger for world peace, and must therefore be eliminated as rapidly as possible. The fact that the Soviet proposal does not envisage the maintenance of the so-called "present military realities" but provides for their quickest possible

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

elimination cannot be adduced as an objection against its adoption. On the contrary, it is one of the principal reasons why the Soviet proposal represents a truly realistic and effective way of translating general and complete disarmament into reality and ensuring the security of States. That is not the case with the Western proposal.

Equally unfounded are the objections which the Western delegations try to raise against the Soviet proposal in regard to the safeguarding of reliable control. Here too they make attempts to refer to the Joint Statement -- this time to paragraph 6, which says that all disarmament measures should be implemented under such effective control as by its extent and nature would be adequate for the disarmament measures being carried out.

The delegations of the socialist countries, including the delegation of Czechoslovakia, have already proved at the 175th meeting the utter groundlessness of the Western objections, in particular as far as the problem of the so-called hidden arms is concerned. The control measures envisaged in the Soviet proposal would give all the States concerned sufficient guarantees that all governments would carry out the agreed disarmament measures with full responsibility. However, the control measures would, in complete harmony with paragraph 6 of the Joint Statement, correspond by their extent and nature to the disarmament measures to be carried out and would exclude the possibility of conducting, under the pretext of control, activities that have nothing in common with control.

Nevertheless -- as was the case with the representative of the United States at the 179th meeting and the representative of the United Kingdom today -- the Western delegations themselves run into a contradiction of paragraph 6 in underlining the problem of the so-called hidden arms. As is known, the United States proposal demands that control should be applicable not only to the disarmament measures to be carried out; it demands the introduction of practically all-embracing control which would apply to all existing weapons and armed forces. The justified and necessary control over disarmament would thus be replaced by control over armament which, from the beginning of the disarmament process, would make it possible for the Western Powers to have unlimited access to the entire territories of the socialist States and would thus legalize the gathering of data vital for the security of the socialist countries.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

The problem of the so-called hidden weapons would be practically non-existent under the Soviet proposal. On the other hand, it might arise in all seriousness in connexion with the United States proposal in respect of its overloaded stage III. It is therefore even more surprising that this point is raised systematically by the Western delegations as a pretext for causing difficulties in our negotiations.

Finally, equally unfounded are the references by the Western delegations to paragraph 7 of the Joint Statement implying that the Soviet proposal has some shortcomings as regards the safeguarding and maintenance of peace under conditions of disarmament. The socialist delegations have convincingly pointed out that the peace-keeping measures under conditions of disarmament in the Soviet proposal are envisaged strictly in accordance with the United Nations Charter. We wish to assure the Western representatives that the socialist countries have no reason to be less interested in such measures than the Western Powers. However, we cannot agree that peace-keeping measures should be placed before disarmament measures, or that they should even hamper their consideration.

On 17 March the representative of the United States put forward one more objection to the Soviet proposal, just as unfounded as all the others. Mr. Fisher said, inter alia:

"As the third stage nears an end, under the Soviet proposals all States with the exception of the United States and the Soviet Union would be approaching complete disarmament ....

"... the non-nuclear Powers might feel that the 'nuclear umbrella' could be turned into an instrument of nuclear blackmail." (ENDC/PV.175, p.9)

That argument used by the Western delegations is beyond our comprehension. It is obvious at first sight that the retention of the "nuclear umbrella" excludes the possibility of any nuclear blackmail, because the Soviet proposal is of a purely defensive character. The Gromyko proposal is formulated quite clearly and unequivocally in this respect. On the other hand, the danger of nuclear blackmail is inherent in the United States proposal, for it is that proposal which leaves room for realistic possibilities in that direction as regards delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons. As is well known, under the

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

United States proposal, even at the beginning of stage III, both great Powers would have at their disposal 35 per cent of all delivery vehicles and practically untouched stockpiles of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that under such circumstances there would be a real danger that such tremendous resources might be misused by certain circles for attempts at nuclear blackmail of other countries.

In my statement today my delegation wished to demonstrate that a unilateral, subjective and incorrect interpretation of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations was being used by the Western delegations in their arguments against the Soviet proposal. Such an approach only shows again that the aim they pursue in objections of this kind is nothing but an attempt to justify their negative position on that proposal -- a position which stands in the way of our making headway in the negotiations on this issue. The approach of the delegations of the Western Powers is even more regrettable because, in the opinion of the majority of delegations in this Committee -- and the statement made on behalf of the delegation of India at the 177th meeting, in particular, brought clear evidence of this -- there exists at present a solid basis provided by the Soviet proposal which would make it possible to find a way out of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that the Western delegations will take a more reasonable position in order that our negotiations may finally achieve positive results.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): At the commencement of my statement I should like, as other speakers this morning have done, to welcome Mr. Nehru on his return to our midst, and also Mr. Thomas, who is with us today to take part in our deliberations.

Some days ago I read in the London Economist the following, which describes our proceedings here:

"Too often the Geneva talkers, agendaless, play hopscotch between alternating discussion of general disarmament and of limited measures, and leave one another's points unanswered in a multiple dialogue of the deaf." To help to avoid such criticisms in future, this morning I should like to comment on certain points made by the representatives of Poland and Romania in their statements at our 179th meeting. As I listened to the statements made this

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

morning by the representatives of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia I could not help thinking that there was some justification for the characterization by the Economist writer of our talks here as sometimes "a multiple dialogue of the deaf", for there has been a repetition of certain arguments -- or, rather, simple assertions -- that statements of the Western representatives have been disproved, when in fact no disproof has ever been given.

However, to revert to what was said by the representatives of Poland and Romania at the meeting of 31 March, they were discussing, as we have been today, the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles and the Gromyko proposal in that connexion (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). I should first like to take up the statement made by the representative of Poland when he said:

"... a simplified, purely arithmetical approach to such an extremely intricate problem as the structure of modern armaments cannot meet the requirements of the balance of security." (ENDC/PV.179, p.6)

He went on to say:

"In addition, if we consider the obvious fact that the growth of armaments has been proceeding at a different rate in each State, we cannot but reach the conclusion that the Western method of applying equal percentage cuts to different types of armaments for all States would not guarantee equal results for those States; by the same token, it would not ensure equal security for all." (ibid., p.7)

It would seem to the Canadian delegation that the plain meaning of that rather oblique statement is that the Soviet Union has not built so many intercontinental ballistic missiles as the United States and that therefore it would be prejudicial to the security of the Soviet Union if equal percentage cuts were made in this class of nuclear weapon vehicles. Mr. Lobodycz seems to argue that the different classes of armaments should be reduced at different rates. Does that mean that at some period each of the great nations should have about the same quantity of armaments in each major category? That would be a most complicated programme to negotiate.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

However, it may be that some differential rate of reduction of certain armaments as between the several Powers might turn out to be a solution. That is certainly an approach which should not be ruled out; but those who favour it should make proposals in specific terms, in numbers or percentages applied to these different classes of armaments. Vague formulations such as we have been given in connexion with the Cromyko "umbrella" are obviously insufficient for a meaningful discussion.

Mr. Lobodycz went on at the same meeting (ibid.) to quote the representative of India, Mr. Trivedi -- as others have quoted him today -- as saying:

"... the menace of nuclear arms has to be eliminated on a priority basis."

(ENDC/PV.177, p.28)

But Mr. Trivedi also said:

"At the same time, we must also bear in mind the consideration that our efforts should not in any way give wrong notions to military adventurists in the world to commit aggression against their neighbours by conventional forces. The answer to this problem is, of course, not to discard the 'nuclear umbrella' thesis but to ensure in our discussions and our negotiations that the plan which we finally agree upon maintains international security." (ibid., p.30)

Mr. Thomas, the representative of the United Kingdom, has already devoted some time to the discussion of Mr. Trivedi's remarks. We have also heard quotations from what the scientists at the Pugwash Conference said. They referred, and I quote from their statement, to --

"... a 'nuclear umbrella' or minimum deterrent force, which we have been discussing in our conferences since 1960, ..."

The scientists then said:

"We regard the possibility of agreement on the principle of a 'nuclear umbrella' or minimum deterrent force to offer one of the most hopeful avenues to reach agreement on general and comprehensive disarmament under effective control."

It will be noted that the scientists did not urge this Committee to agree in principle on the "nuclear umbrella" proposal of the Soviet Union and hear afterwards what it meant. If I may say so, that would be a most unscientific way in which to proceed.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Mr. Lobodycz also said:

"If the 'over-kill capacity' were eliminated and if the United States and the Soviet Union retained only a strictly limited number of delivery vehicles, there could be no imbalance as some Western representatives allege." (ENDC/PV.179, p.7)

It would appear to be the view of the Soviet Union that the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles retained would be not only strictly limited but equal as between themselves and the United States. I quote from a letter to The New York Times by Igor Glagolev, a member of the Soviet Union Institute of World Economics and International Affairs, who participated in the Pugwash Conferences. He wrote:

"I could cite the proposal that the USSR and the United States retain an identical number of rockets throughout general and complete disarmament to guarantee security."

Presumably Mr. Glagolev would hardly have written that letter to The New York Times unless he was sure that that was the meaning of Mr. Gromyko's "umbrella" proposal. We have not, however, been told that in plain terms by the Soviet delegation here.

Mr. Lobodycz asserted that, if the Soviet Union's first-stage disarmament plan were put into effect,

"... no State would gain military advantage, and the security of none of the parties would be jeopardized." (ENDC/PV.179, p.7).

Several times in the past we and other Western delegations have pointed out how the Soviet proposals would leave the categories of armaments in which they are superior -- and which could be used offensively -- at 70 per cent of their present strength. The representative of Czechoslovakia this morning challenged the arguments of the West in this connexion. I would refer him to an article which appears on the front page of today's issue of the Journal de Genève. It is by a writer who belongs to a neutral country, and it indicates quite clearly, in a few words, what would be the resultant military advantage to the Soviet side of the proposals in their first stage as it now stands.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We have also heard quoted a statement in relation to Mr. McNamara's speech to the Economic Club of New York, to the effect that he said there was no difference in the conventional strength of the two sides. As I have pointed out before (ENDC/PV.167, p.9), that was a misrepresentation of what Mr. McNamara said, which applied not to the position that would exist if the proposals of the Soviet Union for the first stage of disarmament were put into effect, but to the current state of affairs in Europe today.

In addition to leaving the categories of armaments in which the Soviet Union and its allies are superior at 70 per cent of their present level, the Soviet proposals call for the removal from Europe of the United States, United Kingdom and Canadian components of the NATO defence forces; and at the same time the nuclear deterrent would be reduced to a very small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, both sides having the same number. That would mean that a nuclear stalemate would exist -- in effect, that the nuclear deterrent would be eliminated except as against nuclear attack by the other side -- and this, of course, would leave the way open to aggression by conventional forces.

Mr. Lobodycz also went on to discuss the control problem. He said that under the United States plan its solution might present great difficulties:

"It is much easier to disclose hidden weapons when the number of missiles retained legally is small than when the number of such missiles is large. " (ENDC/PV.179, p.8)

I regret to say that, although I have thought about this for a considerable length of time, I am still unable to understand the point of Mr. Lobodycz's argument. I have pointed out previously to this Committee (ENDC/PV.167, pp.6,7) that if the number of weapons retained were small, the concealment of a relatively small number could upset the balance; whereas, if the number retained were relatively large, the concealment of a few weapons would not have such a serious effect, and it would also be very difficult to conceal a large enough number to cancel the deterrent effect.

The representative of Poland adduces a counter argument to the effect that the danger of a nuclear conflict is greater when there are a large number of missiles in the possession of States, because a potential aggressor may be tempted to launch a surprise attack if he thinks he has so many more than the adversary that he can be sure of knocking out all the adversary's missiles and therefore suffer no retaliation. That could arise if a serious imbalance existed, perhaps,

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

but neither side will now admit to such an imbalance. I would remark that we have recently had statements from authorities both in the Soviet Union and in the United States to the effect that, with the present degree of armament, neither side could initiate a nuclear war without suffering tremendous destruction and that therefore it is highly unlikely that any government composed of rational men would initiate such a war.

I should like to quote from this morning's Journal de Genève reporting Mr. Khrushchev's speech in Hungary. He is reported as saying: "In the United States they claim: 'With our bombs, we can destroy the Soviet Union'; but they add in a whisper: 'The Soviet Union could do the same to us' ... It would be madness for us to destroy each other", Mr. Khrushchev concluded. "We are therefore fighting for peaceful coexistence." If that is the case with the present high level of armaments, if no government is likely to begin a nuclear war in the present situation of heavy armaments and mutual distrust, would any government be more likely to do so when agreement had been reached on a systematic and verified percentage reduction of the most important armaments, including nuclear weapon delivery vehicles? The beginning of such a process would create confidence, which would continue to grow as armaments were reduced. In the view of the Canadian delegation, this is the practicable and reasonable way to deal with the menace of nuclear war.

Another statement made by the representative of Poland appeared to my delegation to be not quite accurate. He said:

"In a world without arms, armed aggressions will become a physical impossibility." (ENDC/PV.179, p.10)

I would remark that recently we have been reading in the newspapers of armed aggressions in the province of Kwilu in the Congo, where the aggressors, armed only with bows and arrows, were in rebellion against the central Government. That is an extreme case; but aggressions would certainly be possible in a disarmed world as contemplated in the Statement of Agreed Principles, according to which the police or militia would still have firearms.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Certainly, when we have reached that final stage of disarmament the danger of great conventional wars, such as the First and Second World Wars, with their attendant horrors will be eliminated. However, the point of the arguments adduced by the Western Powers against the Soviet plan for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, with which the Gromyko "umbrella" proposal is combined, is that, while it might reduce the possibility of nuclear war in the early stages, it would also leave open during those same stages the possibility of a conventional war such as we have seen in the past. I think I echo here the arguments put forward earlier by my United Kingdom colleague.

The representative of Poland also paraphrased a question I asked recently, and suggested that, if the Western Powers had adopted the Soviet plan for the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles in 1962, the world would be much safer today (ibid.). But the fact is that the Soviet plan was quite unacceptable inasmuch as it did not conform to the principles of verification and balance. That was established by the criticism directed at it by the Western group in this Conference and repeated by Mr. Thomas today. That is why this plan was amended successively by Mr. Gromyko's proposals introduced at the seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the General Assembly.

These proposals were welcomed in that they were seen as a move towards a more realistic approach to the problem. But the trouble is that they do not go far enough. Unfortunately, we have still been unable to get any explanation from the Soviet Union delegation of how verification of the amended plan is to be carried out; nor will it give us even an illustrative programme of how the Soviet Union proposes that the reduction in the first stage will be carried out in accordance with the principle of avoiding military advantage for either side.

The representative of Romania remarked on 31 March that to rely on nuclear power to deter aggression --

"... can only encourage the arms race, thus endangering the security of States". (ibid.. p.17)

But both sides now consider that the main purpose of their nuclear forces is to deter aggression. If this is recognized by the Warsaw Pact Powers represented here, and if they also recognize that present levels of armaments should not be increased, it is rather difficult for the Canadian delegation to understand why they reject so summarily the freeze on the construction of nuclear weapon vehicles proposed by the United States (ENDC/120).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Mr. Dumitrescu also remarked that the Western delegations urge "the retention of a deterrent" (ENDC/PV.179, p.17). In fact the Gromyko proposals are for the retention of a deterrent force, though of course on a lower scale than the existing forces. There is nothing different in principle here.

Mr. Dumitrescu also remarked:

"The proposals to reduce by a certain percentage the number of nuclear delivery vehicles would result in preserving, if not increasing, the strategic military advantage which the authors of the proposal think they possess. Clearly, proposals of that type are not likely to ensure the security of States." (ibid., p.18)

This statement is somewhat ambiguous. Did the representative of Romania mean that one side actually did have a strategic military advantage? It seems that, if there should be such an advantage in existence, favouring one side or the other, a percentage reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles would not increase that advantage.

Mr. Dumitrescu also observed that --

"... while the former proposal" --

that is, the Soviet Union proposal --

"would considerably reduce, if not eliminate, the possibility of a nuclear war, the latter" --

that is, the United States proposal --

"would not only not eliminate that possibility, but would preserve or even increase it". (ibid., p.19)

It is interesting to note that Mr. Dumitrescu admits that the possibility of a nuclear war is not excluded under the Soviet Union proposals. We would agree with him in this case; although, as I have been arguing, we do not agree that the United States plan for percentage reductions (ENDC/30) would increase the danger of nuclear war. We do not see how that could happen.

Surely, what would do more than anything else to remove the danger of nuclear war and the tensions which it creates would be for the nuclear Powers to come to some agreement for a systematic reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles in accordance with the Agreed Principles on which our negotiation here is supposed to be based. The Canadian delegation feels that within the framework of these principles there are many possibilities for coming to an agreement which would be to the advantage of both sides.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The representative of Poland rather optimistically said:

"Once a decision of such great importance as the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament has been reached, there should be, I submit, no extraordinary difficulties in carrying out Articles 42 and 43 of the United Nations Charter". (ENDC/PV.179, p.9)

Just before that, he had said that if we had not succeeded in carrying into effect the peace-keeping provisions of the Charter, it was "only because no agreement could be reached concerning their implementation" (ibid.). Certainly that is true, and it exposes the defect of the Charter's peace-keeping arrangements -- a defect which everybody recognizes. That defect is that the veto of one country -- when one country does not agree --- can prevent the Security Council from taking peace-keeping action desired by the great majority of the United Nations membership. It was to get around such impasses that the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 1950 was passed. But there are reasons why this procedure is unsatisfactory, and why better peace-keeping arrangements than those of Chapter VII of the Charter will be needed if we are to live in peace and justice in a disarmed world.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Last Tuesday Mr. Fisher, the representative of the United States, spoke (ENDC/PV.179, pp.12 et seq.) against the Indian representative's proposal (ENDC/PV.177, pp. 28 et seq.) that we should agree in principle on the Soviet proposal for the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, with the exception of an agreed and strictly limited number of missiles to be retained in the territory of the USSR and the United States until the end of the third stage of disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1).

All those who are genuinely interested in the progress of our discussions are bound to express their profound regret that the United States representative should have taken up this position. This proposal by India undoubtedly paves the way for a fruitful co-operative effort by the Committee to draw up, on this basis, the most important provisions for the first stage of disarmament, provisions removing the threat of a nuclear missile war. The Indian proposal would make it possible to pass from general discussion to work on particular substantive issues --- for instance, agreement on the number of missiles to be retained, and so forth.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In arguing against the proposal made by the Indian representative on 24 March, Mr. Fisher hesitated to touch on the basic idea underlying this proposal -- the necessity of the immediate removal of the threat of nuclear missile war at the very outset of the implementation of general and complete disarmament. The fact that Mr. Fisher carefully side-stepped this vital, central issue is quite understandable to everybody, since the United States proposals, as has been made absolutely clear in the Committee, do not remove the threat of nuclear war, nor do they set out to do so.

Instead of dealing with this issue, Mr. Fisher concentrated on the idea that the United States proposals would guarantee a "regular, ordered and balanced" implementation of disarmament (ENDC/PV.179, p.15). We have already explained on many occasions the meaning of this complicated triple term -- "regular, ordered and balanced" implementation of disarmament. This Western term means, in essence, the preservation of the possibility of war and the preservation of armaments and armed forces for this purpose. This is what the United States and its Western allies view as their main concern.

In our own proposals for disarmament we do not view as our main concern the preservation of a nuclear balance as this is understood by Mr. Fisher: namely, the preservation of the possibility of nuclear missile war; our main concern is to remove the threat of a nuclear missile war and to guarantee the security of States in equal measure. This and this alone is the purpose of the Soviet Union's proposals.

We agree with Mr. Fisher's observation that --

"The nature and extent of the control should depend upon the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage" (ibid., p. 14).

We have in fact always contended that control measures should be dependent on and adapted to disarmament measures. This idea is at the heart of our proposals. The Western delegations are, however, trying to obscure the question of control by monstrously inflating its importance. The real issue is being drowned out by the clamour over control. As a result of the piling up of unwarranted demands for control, the fundamental question of disarmament is being pushed into the background.

On 17 March (ENDC/PV.175, pp. 19, 20) Mr. Burns said that, without adequate control, the Western delegations could not accept in principle the Soviet proposal for the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles except for those missiles

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

which would remain in the territory of the Soviet Union and the United States under the "nuclear umbrella" proposal. He claimed that the Soviet proposal did not guarantee adequate verification of the proposed measures. This opinion of the Soviet proposal expressed by Mr. Burns is an unsubstantiated assertion completely at variance with the Soviet Union's proposals for control over the fulfilment by States of their obligations under the "nuclear umbrella" proposal.

In his statement today Mr. Thomas, the United Kingdom representative, told us that he was not satisfied with the Soviet proposals for control in the first stage of disarmament, that he considered these proposals to be inadequate and incapable of ensuring the verification of disarmament measures. With a view to putting an end once and for all to such unwarranted bargaining -- and even at the expense perhaps of wearying you -- I propose to enumerate the control measures for the first stage of disarmament which are included in the Soviet draft treaty for the purpose of verifying the destruction of nuclear vehicles.

These measures are as follows.

During the first stage of disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization will, in accordance with the Soviet proposal for the elimination of rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons, verify the implementation of the following measures: the elimination from the armed forces and the destruction of all rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational or tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category, to be retained by the USSR and the United States, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the third stage. They will verify the strictly limited number of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses under the provisions of article 15 of the Soviet draft treaty. They will verify at the launching pads the missiles to be retained under the provisions of the treaty until the end of the third stage of disarmament; the complete demolition of all launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of rockets and pilotless aircraft; the destruction of all instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of rockets and pilotless aircraft; the demolition of all underground depots for such rockets, pilotless aircraft and auxiliary facilities.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

They will control the complete discontinuance of the production of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft, and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance; the dismantling of all undertakings or workshops thereof engaged in their production; the destruction of machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for their production; the conversion to peaceful uses of the premises of undertakings as well as of general-purpose machine tools and equipment; the demolition of all proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft.

The Soviet draft treaty further provides that the production and testing of appropriate rockets for the peaceful exploration of space shall be allowed; provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

The Soviet draft treaty provides for the following further measures of control for the first stage of disarmament:

The inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization will verify the implementation of the following measures:

They will verify the elimination from the armed forces and the destruction of all military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons; the rendering inoperative or the conversion to peaceful uses of military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft and the repair and maintenance facilities and storage premises at such airfields; the closing of training establishments for crews of such aircraft; the complete discontinuance of the production of all the above-mentioned military aircraft; the dismantling or conversion to the production of civil aircraft or other civilian goods of all undertakings or workshops thereof designed for the production of such military aircraft.

They will verify the elimination from the armed forces and the destruction of all surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and of submarines of all classes or types; the demolition or dismantling and handing over to the merchant marine for peaceful uses of naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of the above warships and submarines; the complete discontinuance of the building of warships and submarines; the dismantling or conversion to peaceful production of shipyards and plants wholly or partly designed for the building of such warships and submarines.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

They will verify the elimination from the armed forces and destruction of all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons; the destruction of all auxiliary equipment and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems; the destruction or the conversion to peaceful uses of surface storage premises and transport facilities for such systems; the complete destruction of the entire stock of non-nuclear munitions for such artillery systems, whether at the gunsite or in depots; the destruction of underground depots for such artillery systems and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof.

They will verify the complete discontinuance of the production of these artillery systems; the closing and dismantling of all plants and workshops thereof engaged in the production of such systems; the destruction of all specialized equipment and machine tools at these closed or dismantled plants or workshops, and the conversion of the remainder to peaceful uses; the discontinuance of the production of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems; the complete dismantling of plants and workshops engaged in the production of such munitions and the destruction of their specialized equipment.

All the forms of control I have mentioned relate solely to the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. I am not here referring to the controls applicable to other disarmament measures in the first and later stages.

We consider that this whole range of control measures, this whole series of verification arrangements with their wide coverage during the very first stage of disarmament, fully meet the need to ensure adequate verification of the implementation of the agreement on the elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles during the first stage, and to ensure control of the missiles left as part of the "nuclear umbrella".

The Western Powers nevertheless contend that they are not satisfied with this control; they are continuing to intensify their demands for control and making more and more stipulations. Today the United Kingdom representative sounded a pessimistic note, alleging that it would be difficult to verify so large a number of disarmament measures during the period of eighteen months suggested by the Soviet Union. This is an untenable argument, since control would take the form of observing, of verifying the physical action to be taken. If, during the eighteen-month period specified for the first stage in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, it is

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

possible to destroy the armaments we propose and to reduce the armed forces, it will obviously also be possible to control the implementation of such measures. Control would, after all, be effected simultaneously with the implementation of a given measure of disarmament.

The attempts by Mr. Thomas to give the impression that it would be impossible or extremely difficult to carry out the disarmament measures included in the Soviet draft treaty for the first stage within the time-limit proposed for this stage are unconvincing and groundless. We consider that it is perfectly feasible. We make a formal statement to this effect here and now.

I would suggest to Mr. Thomas that we should make a start and see in practice who is right. I am convinced that we shall be proved right. Mr. Thomas should remember that to destroy is not the same thing as to build. Even by modern methods, it takes several months at least to build a multi-storey house, but it takes only a few hours to destroy it. The difficulties in implementing the disarmament measures which Mr. Thomas has described are therefore completely subjective and imaginary, not objective or real.

Mr. Thomas today attempted to alarm the Committee by referring to the large number of disarmament measures to remove the threat of nuclear war which the Soviet Union is proposing for the first stage. But let us see where precisely the difference lies. Your proposal is that conventional armaments should be reduced by 30 per cent in the first stage, and we have come to meet you on this point. You propose that armed forces should be reduced to 2.1 million men in the first stage, whereas the Soviet Union proposes a reduction to 1.9 million. As you see, the difference is not sufficiently great to corroborate your argument about the impossibility of verifying a reduction of armed forces on the scale proposed by the Soviet Union.

There remain nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The United States proposes that these should be reduced by 30 per cent during the first stage. The Soviet Union, concerned to remove the threat of a nuclear missile war, proposes that all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be destroyed except for an agreed and strictly limited number of missiles to be retained in the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the third stage.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Thomas states that, under this Soviet proposal, seventy missiles will have to be destroyed each week. But can this be an argument for rejecting the Soviet proposal? The destruction of seventy missiles a week means destroying six missiles a day on each side. But it is obvious to everyone that each side could set up, say, six special teams for the elimination of delivery vehicles and that each of these teams could easily destroy one missile a day. Everything can be carried out, Mr. Thomas. All that is needed is a favourable attitude towards disarmament, and this is just what the Western Powers lack. This and this alone accounts for their unwarranted assumptions and doubts. It is evident that the Western Powers are not in fact aiming at disarmament under adequate control. They do not want serious disarmament measures, nor do they want adequate control if it is a question of applying such control to serious disarmament measures.

This is what Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada, said on 15 May 1963. In explaining the position of the Western Powers in regard to the disarmament measures envisaged for the first stage in the Soviet draft treaty for general and complete disarmament, Mr. Burns said -- and I would draw the Committee's attention to the point I am now making -- that the disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union for the first stage were unacceptable to the NATO Powers even if these measures were implemented with adequate verification and even if, taken as a whole, they guaranteed the balance of armed forces and armaments between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/PV.132, pp. 22,23). As you see, the Western Powers wish to "guard" the world, not from war, but from disarmament. In all conditions and circumstances they oppose any serious disarmament measure.

This persistent reluctance of the Western Powers to agree to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles clearly shows that these Powers are still clinging to a policy which has been completely discredited throughout the world, the "position of strength" policy, the policy of trust in the nuclear bomb. This is why they wish to retain both nuclear bombs and the means of delivering them -- missiles and bomber aircraft --, covering up this fact by expressing groundless misgivings or, I might say, by sounding a false alarm about the possibility of concealing missiles.

This is the key to an understanding of the present negative position of the Western Powers towards any serious proposal providing for effective measures of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

disarmament. This is the reason why on 17 March, Mr. Burns called the Soviet proposal a completely "unattainable object" (ENDC/PV.175, p.18). But this Soviet proposal, Mr. Burns, is an unattainable object only from the position of the Western Powers, which do not wish to bind themselves by really serious measures of disarmament. But with such an approach to the question of disarmament on the part of the Western Powers, the world will eventually lose all hope of achieving the aims of disarmament with the capitalist West.

It is high time the Western Powers renounced their bankrupt "position of strength" policy and seriously -- not in words, but in deeds -- based their relations with other States on the principles of peaceful co-existence. All their far-fetched arguments and objections to the Soviet proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" will then automatically disappear.

It is essential for the Western Powers to change their attitude towards the issue of disarmament and to join the rest of the world in striving to direct their efforts towards ensuring equal security for all, an aim which can be attained only by genuine, not fictitious, measures of disarmament. The Soviet proposal for the destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, except for the strictly limited and agreed number of missiles to be retained by the USSR and the United States in their own territory, constitutes a step fully consonant with this aim. This proposal will remove the possibility of a nuclear missile war in the very first stage of disarmament, thus meeting the security interests of all States, all nations, of the world in equal measure.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like once again to draw the Committee's attention to the proposal made by Mr. Trivedi, the representative of India, on 24 March (ENDC/PV.177, pp. 28 et seq.). The course of action he suggested seems to us to be the right one. The Soviet delegation considers that acceptance of this recommendation by India would mean that we could get down to serious work and reach joint agreement on all the details of this Soviet proposal. Let us accept the proposal for a "nuclear umbrella" in principle. We can then go on to more detailed work on the various practical aspects of implementing this proposal. We are all waiting for a positive answer from the Western Powers, which would pave the way for progress in the work of our Committee.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should merely like to make some very brief remarks concerning today's meeting. I noticed that the representative of Bulgaria began his statement by saying that the Western delegations were avoiding a full and useful debate on the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). I believe the statements which we heard this morning by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Canada were further proof of the goodwill, interest and earnestness with which the Western delegations have studied and are continuing to study the Gromyko proposal, in spite of its drawbacks and difficulties.

All the Eastern representatives who spoke this morning again explained, among other things, their point of view on the principle of balance. This subject was not, of course, the only one to be considered. Some of these delegations unfortunately repeated this morning the assertion that the Western Powers wish to retain nuclear weapons as long as possible in order to preserve the possibility of starting a nuclear war. This is an argument which we have heard all too often here and which can no longer mislead anyone, so that it seems to me quite pointless to answer it.

At the same time, Mr. Tsarapkin told us that he was afraid of wearying us by repeated references to the many measures of control envisaged in the Soviet draft treaty. I should like to assure him that he will never weary us by speaking on this subject. I shall, of course, study the statement he made today, but I should like to tell him here and now that we should be glad to hear even longer and more comprehensive statements on this subject, particularly if they took account of and provided an answer to the difficulties which we have clearly outlined in our statements on control.

Mr. Tsarapkin also spoke this morning, in reply to the statement by the United Kingdom representative, on the question of overloading the first stage of disarmament. I should like to remind him in this connexion of what I believe he himself has previously stated: that 1 per cent of present nuclear armaments would already constitute an appalling war potential and might entail a fearful danger of nuclear conflict (ENDC/PV.175, p.29). I therefore think that the reduction of missiles proposed by the Soviet delegation for the first stage would be at least 99 per cent or even more. It may therefore be asked whether such a massive

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

reduction during the first stage might not throw the whole process of disarmament out of balance.

I should like, however, to focus my very brief remarks on the question of balance, which all the Eastern delegations mentioned again this morning. I hope that the statements on this subject by the Eastern delegations do not reflect their intention to go back on their word, to abandon a principle to which all of us in the United Nations have subscribed. I believe, however, that we witnessed this morning an attempt to divorce the two factors involved in point 5 of the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), the first being that no military advantage should be gained, and the second that security should be ensured. The Eastern delegations tried to draw a distinction, even to find a possible contradiction between these two factors. These are in fact clearly complementary and integral parts of a whole. This is so obvious that in the text in question they are joined by the word "and" and not by "or". Nor could it be otherwise. If, during the process of disarmament, one party were to seize a military advantage, the security of the other would inevitably be weakened as a result; and it would in any case be difficult to persuade countries to disarm if they were asked to accept sacrifice of varying military value from the first stage.

I believe that we can freely discuss the question of whether or not a particular measure conforms to the principle of balance. Such a discussion comes properly within the scope of a fruitful debate designed to exclude or modify measures which would not conform to this principle. But it would be disastrous for us to challenge the principle of balance itself. It is only if we continue to take the Agreed Principles as a base that work on the Gromyko proposal can serve any useful purpose, since we can hope that at some point the Soviet delegation will agree to modify its position in the light of the objections which we have made.

Unfortunately Mr. Tsarapkin confirmed this morning that the policy of the Soviet delegation has not changed. It is the same policy which his delegation has adopted for some of its other proposals: it consists of seeking to obtain preliminary approval in principle without the basic problems involved in these proposals being solved or even known. As the Committee is aware, we consider that the reverse procedure should be followed: that we should first examine, and

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

if possible solve, the basic problems, and then proceed to the over-all solution. I believe this point of view is shared by the great majority of the delegations present here. It is indeed with this object in view that several representatives of non-aligned countries have also asked questions and raised queries.

It was the statement made on 18 February by the representative of India (ENDC/PV.167, pp. 19 et seq.) which brought home to me the need for a systematic agenda for the discussion of the Gromyko proposal; and I have suggested dividing it into three parts: balance, control and organization of peace (ENDC/PV.175, p.37). Listening to Mr. Nehru at that time, I realized the multiplicity of problems to be examined and the need for a methodical and co-ordinated system of work. Many questions raised by the representative of India on 18 February, like questions raised by other delegations on the subject of the "nuclear umbrella", have still received neither a solution nor a satisfactory reply. But I believe that, in the first place, if we are to understand each other fully, we must reach agreement on the meaning of the term "nuclear umbrella". If this term means that, at a given stage of the disarmament process, only a fixed and strictly limited quantity of atomic weapons would remain on one side and the other, we could then say that there was agreement in principle on this point.

On the other hand, it would be a different matter if we were asked to give our approval a priori to the particular "nuclear umbrella" envisaged in Mr. Gromyko's proposal. As the delegation of India has pointed out in its statements, we are not fully informed on the scope and implications of this proposal, while the results of our first studies are, in my opinion, somewhat negative. It would thus be very difficult for us -- and I believe for everyone -- to approve the Gromyko proposal in principle at this stage of our work. I think that at the moment all that we can and should do is to continue an objective examination of the problems involved in the Gromyko proposal in the hope that the Soviet delegation will come to realize the drawbacks of that proposal and change its position.

We should incidentally not forget that other important subjects, other problems are on our agenda and await examination. At some time or other we shall have to take up these problems too.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I should like to reserve for a later meeting the possibility of a rather detailed reply to the various points raised by the representative of the Soviet Union.

At this time, however, I should like to express my surprise at one statement which he made. He described the United States position as being one of wanting to preserve the possibility of war. I find that statement somewhat surprising because it seems to be out of tune with the spirit which has characterized --- and which will, I hope, continue to characterize --- our work. I find it surprising also because --- and I say this with the greatest respect --- it simply is not accurate. Furthermore, it does not take into account the commitments we entered into in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). It is precisely because the Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) seems to us not to make adequate provision for measures to prevent the possibility of war that we have found it unacceptable. I refer, of course, to the absence of a commensurate build-up in peace-keeping machinery, to the lack of balance, and to the absence of proper provisions for verification in the Soviet proposal.

With respect to the last point, I of course intend to read the remarks of the Soviet representative with the greatest care. However, I listened with the greatest interest to what he had to say, and I frankly confess that I did not hear suggested any means which would give reasonable assurance on the problem we have dealt with: that is, the problem of ensuring that vehicles are not retained clandestinely -- a problem which, as we have observed, is quite a critical one in view of the depth of the cuts which we understand our Soviet colleague proposes.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): Permit me now to say a few words on behalf of the delegation of Poland. I have listened with great attention to the statement made today by the representative of Canada, particularly in so far as he dealt with my intervention at the 179th meeting. I should like to make just a brief comment on one of the points he made.

I was happy to hear that Mr. Burns did not rule out a differentiated approach to the reduction of different categories of armaments. Such an approach has been provided for precisely by the Soviet disarmament programme: the largest cuts in the most lethal types of weapons; less substantial cuts in others. If my

(The Chairman, Poland)

interpretation of Mr. Burns's statement is correct, this could constitute a basis for our further discussion. What, then, prevents him from accepting the Soviet concept of disarmament? However, I propose to study his statement of today with care and to reply to it in due time.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I understood the representative of the Soviet Union to have quoted in his statement from something I said at our 132nd meeting which is recorded on page 22 of the relevant verbatim record. I should simply like to say that I have procured a copy of the verbatim record of that meeting and cannot find that anything in it actually has the same sense as what I heard in the interpretation today. That may have arisen from interpretation difficulties; but I should like the members of the Committee, when they read the verbatim record of today's meeting, to refer back to page 22 and the following pages of the record of our 132nd meeting, when they will see that what I was represented as having said by Mr. Tsarapkin today, according to the English interpretation, is not at all comparable to what is actually recorded in document ENDC/PV.132.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I am surprised at this belated attempt by Mr. Burns to deny what he said. I have already before had occasion to quote this passage from the record, and there are no obscurities. I think it very unlikely that there were any obscurities in the interpretation either. In any event, I can have this quotation prepared for our next meeting in English so that the interpretation will be quite irrelevant. I have said the same thing before, and Mr. Burns did not then dispute it.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 181st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. M. Łobodycz, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Canada, the Soviet Union, Italy, the United States and Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, ~~9-April~~ 9 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.